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STATE EMPLOYERS ARE NOT SOVEREIGN: BY ANALOGY, 
TRANSFER THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO 
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE TO STATES AS 
EMPLOYERS 
LARA GARDNER* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Note argues that states should be treated as market partici-
pants and not be given sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment when they are acting as private employers. Through an 
expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court 
has restricted the right of state employees to sue under federal stat-
utes intended to protect employees when the state is the employer 
and it claims sovereign immunity.1 Under the market participant ex-
ception to the dormant Commerce Clause, if a state is acting as a 
market participant, rather than a market regulator, it is no longer 
bound by the restraints of the Commerce Clause. The reasons that 
states acting as employers should be treated as market participants 
rather than sovereigns are as persuasive as the arguments supporting 
the market participant exception. By analogy, this doctrine should be 
transferred from its exclusive application in the dormant Commerce 
Clause context to include instances when states are acting as employ-
ers and thus, market participants. Traditionally, the market partici-
pant exception has worked to states’ benefit, allowing them to act in 
 
 * J.D., Lewis and Clark Law School, 2003; Associate Attorney, Todd Trierweiler & 
Associates, Portland, Oregon. I would like to thank Professor Steve Kanter, Professor of Law, 
Lewis and Clark Law School. I am immensely grateful to him for his editing insights, and for 
discussing this issue with me on numerous occasions before I actually put fingers to the key-
board. I would also like to thank Professor Michelle Travis, Associate Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of San Francisco School of Law, for suggesting that this Note would be a good candidate 
for the Louis Jackson National Student Writing Competition. 
 1. Currently, the only mechanisms available to sue states without violating the principles 
of the Eleventh Amendment are waiver, suits against state officers, and abrogation. See Timo-
thy S. McFadden, The New Age of the Eleventh Amendment: A Survey of the Supreme Court’s 
Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence and a Review of Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 27 J.C. 
& U.L. 519, 537 (2000); Sabina Sosunova & Bonnie A. Tucker, The Eleventh Amendment: “A 
Work in Progress”, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 255, 263–64 (2001). See discussion infra Part 
III.A on why these mechanisms are not enough to vindicate individual rights. 
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the same capacity as a private company without Commerce Clause 
concern. If states are going to enjoy the benefits of private employers, 
they ought to be subject to the same limits as private employers as 
well. As an employer, a state is not acting in its regulatory capacity. 
Rather, it is acting as a private actor. Therefore, it should be treated 
as a market participant and not evade regulation by claiming sover-
eign immunity. 
I. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
A variety of rationales have been postulated to support the the-
ory of state sovereign immunity. Until fairly recently, with decisions 
such as Alden v. Maine,2 the constitutional authority used to endow 
states with sovereign immunity has been the Tenth Amendment. 
When the Tenth Amendment proved not sufficiently successful as a 
vehicle for state sovereign immunity, Eleventh Amendment argu-
ments were used as a supplement.3 Lately, the Court has applied rea-
soning beyond the Eleventh Amendment to justify state sovereign 
immunity. 
A. The Tenth Amendment 
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution states that “[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”4 The Supreme Court stated in 1941 that the Tenth 
Amendment was nothing more than “declaratory” that Congress 
must have authority to act under the Constitution.5 This approach was 
followed until 1976 when the Court, in National League of Cities v. 
Usery, invalidated a federal law for violating the Tenth Amendment 
on the grounds that Congress was abrogating state sovereignty.6 The 
 
 2. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). The Court in this case characterizes “[state sovereign] immunity as 
an absolute precept of political and legal tradition,” and “conveniently sidesteps the textual 
limitations of the Amendment.” Matthew Mustokoff, Sovereign Immunity and the Crisis of 
Constitutional Absolutism: Interpreting the Eleventh Amendment after Alden v. Maine, 53 ME. L. 
REV. 81, 85 (2001). 
 3. See George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court—How the Eleventh 
Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State 
Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363 (1985). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 5. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“There is nothing in the history of its 
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national 
and state governments. . . .”). 
 6. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). 
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case involved the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).7 The FLSA 
required employers pay employees a minimum hourly wage and one 
and half times the regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 
forty hours per week.8 The Court held that state autonomy was suffi-
cient to invalidate the application of the statute to state and local 
governments.9 The Court stated that the Commerce Clause did not 
empower Congress to enforce the provisions of the FLSA against 
states in “traditional governmental functions.”10 After this decision, 
litigants began bringing Tenth Amendment challenges to other laws. 
Nearly ten years later, however, after a series of decisions where 
the Court rejected state sovereignty challenges under the Tenth 
Amendment,11 a divided Court decided, in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, that the standards in National League 
of Cities had proven unworkable.12 In Garcia, another FLSA case, the 
Court expressly overruled National League of Cities.13 The Court 
stated that it was too difficult to determine where Congressional au-
thority ended and State regulatory immunity began.14 The Court also 
stated that “[a]ny substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce 
Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of 
this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possi-
ble failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a 
‘sacred province of state autonomy.’”15 
Garcia was a 5–4 decision, with the dissents’ assurances that the 
Court would return to the reasoning of National League of Cities. 
Their predictions proved somewhat accurate; in 1991, the Court re-
vived the Tenth Amendment in Gregory v. Ashcroft. The basis for the 
decision in Gregory was statutory construction and not the Tenth 
 
 7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2000). 
 8. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 835–36. 
 9. Id. at 852. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (application of 
the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railway did not violate the Tenth Amendment); Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment 
challenge to portions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 which required state 
utility commissions consider FERC proposals); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (up-
holding a federal law forcing states to comply with the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act). 
 12. 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 530–31. 
 15. Id. at 554 (quoting Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 236). 
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Amendment.16 However, the Court readdressed State sovereign im-
munity under the Tenth Amendment. In Gregory, state court judges 
in Missouri challenged as a violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”)17 a provision of the Missouri Constitu-
tion setting a mandatory retirement age for state judges.18 The Court 
held that a federal law will be applied to the states only if there is an 
unambiguous statement from Congress that it “intends to pre-empt 
the historic powers of the States.”19 Such a mandate would make it 
clear that Congress is choosing to exercise the full extent of its pow-
ers.20 In the Court’s estimation, the ADEA lacked such a clear man-
date,21 and therefore, refused to preempt the mandatory retirement 
age.22 The Court also stressed that the Tenth Amendment protects 
state sovereignty.23 
Two decisions followed Gregory which affirmatively used the 
Tenth Amendment to invalidate federal employment laws, New York 
v. United States24 and Printz v. United States.25 In New York, the Court 
held that although Congress has substantial power to govern the na-
tion “including areas of intimate concern to the States,” that power 
did not allow Congress to compel the states to act according to Con-
gressional mandate.26 In Printz, the Court stated that Congress could 
not “issue directives” to the states, ordering them to “address particu-
lar problems []or command State[] officers . . . to administer or en-
force federal” programs.27 Although these cases used the Tenth 
Amendment to invalidate the laws, the application of the Tenth 
Amendment was different from that used in National League of Cities 
and Garcia. 
National League of Cities attempted to define where federal au-
thority ended and state authority began. The Congressional acts in 
question were examined as being on one side of the line or the other. 
This approach was ultimately discarded in Garcia. The Garcia court 
 
 16. 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991). 
 17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2000). 
 18. 501 U.S. at 455. 
 19. Id. at 461. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 467. 
 22. Id. at 473. 
 23. Id. at 463. 
 24. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 25. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 26. 505 U.S. at 162. 
 27. 521 U.S. at 935. 
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determined that state sovereign immunity had to derive from the 
structure of the federal system itself.28 
New York and Printz were not concerned with any lines or sub-
stantive structure.29 Rather, in both cases, the Court said the Tenth 
Amendment was a rule to interpret the Constitution, and that the 
states retain original power not divested by the Constitution.30 
In 2000, the Court unanimously rejected a Tenth Amendment 
challenge to the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”)31 
in Reno v. Condon.32 South Carolina challenged the statute on Tenth 
Amendment grounds, arguing that the statute made state officials the 
“unwilling implementors of federal policy.”33 The Court agreed that 
the statute would require effort by state employees, but disagreed 
that the principles of New York or Printz applied.34 The Court distin-
guished these cases and further defined the principles under which 
Congress can regulate the states. The Court stated, “[t]he Federal 
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to ad-
dress particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those 
of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regu-
latory program.”35 The Court did not agree with South Carolina that 
the statute violated these principles. The Court stated that the DPPA 
does not require the state to regulate its citizens; rather, the DPPA 
regulates the states as the owners of the driver record database.36 
One of the Court’s reasons for upholding the DPPA is that the 
statute “regulates the universe of entities that participate as suppliers 
to the market for motor vehicle information.”37 Because South Caro-
lina is one of these “entities,” it can be regulated. This is the reason 
states should be regulated as employers, but paradoxically, they are 
not. 
 
 28. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 548–51 (1985). 
 29. Rather, these cases were concerned with procedural structure, saying that there were 
Tenth Amendment limits to the manner in which the federal government acted vis-à-vis the 
states, even though the federal government had substantive power under the Commerce Clause 
and under Garcia. 
 30. 505 U.S. at 156; 521 U.S. at 918–19. 
 31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2000). 
 32. 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). 
 33. Id. at 150. 
 34. Id. at 149. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 151. 
 37. Id. 
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Although the Tenth Amendment has been somewhat useful for 
arguing state sovereign immunity, the holding of Garcia is still good 
law. Based on that decision, the Court is unlikely to examine a statute 
based on an appraisal of whether it is “integral” or “traditional.”38 
However, lately, the Court has used the limits imposed by the Elev-
enth Amendment to define what actions Congress can authorize 
against the states. In fact, recent decisions have looked beyond the 
Eleventh Amendment to justify broad state sovereign immunity. 
B. The Eleventh Amendment39 
The Eleventh Amendment is a strange amendment that has of-
ten been misinterpreted since its inception. Thirty years after the rati-
fication of the Constitution, a group of private citizens from the state 
of South Carolina sued the state of Georgia in federal court.40 Follow-
ing the Supreme Court’s decision holding that Georgia had no immu-
nity from suit by a citizen of another state, the Eleventh Amendment 
was created.41 
The text of the Eleventh Amendment declares that “[t]he Judi-
cial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State.”42 This new amendment limited the ability of 
citizens to sue a state that was not their own. Nearly one hundred 
years later, in Hans v. Louisiana, the Court interpreted the Eleventh 
Amendment to limit the ability of citizens to sue their own state as 
well.43 
The Court in Hans theorized that because the Eleventh 
Amendment was ratified so quickly, it must have meant that the 
states intended to be immune as sovereigns.44 Justice Bradley, writing 
 
 38. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985). 
 39. See McFadden, supra note 1, for an in depth analysis of the background of state sover-
eign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. 
 40. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that Article III, § 2 of the 
Constitution authorized suits against the states); McFadden, supra note 1, at 522. 
 41. See McFadden, supra note 1, at 524. “Less than three weeks after the Chisholm deci-
sion, both houses of Congress had approved the Eleventh Amendment,” and it was ratified 
within a year. Id. Many commentators have argued that such rapid ratification was evidence that 
the decision was incorrect. Id. However, it is arguable that the war debts owed by the states and 
concern over repayment played a role in the expeditious ratification. 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 43. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 44. Id. at 11–12. 
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for the majority, argued that the Framers of the Constitution in-
tended that the states retain sovereign immunity.45 In effect, the Elev-
enth Amendment also meant to exclude suits by states’ own citizens.46 
Today, the Hans reasoning is used to support a broad reading and 
application of the Eleventh Amendment.47 However, there is no con-
sistent agreement as to what the Eleventh Amendment means.48 
Recent decisions have not been a clear majority; rather, opinions 
are splintered, with each Justice writing a separate opinion or dissent. 
In all but one case, the decisions are always a 5–4 split, with Justices 
Rehnquist, Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas upholding state 
sovereign immunity and a broad reading of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter arguing for 
less sovereign immunity and a more narrow reading of the Eleventh 
Amendment.49 The divided opinions are also often severed even fur-
ther. For example, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,50 Justice 
Stevens and Justice Souter each wrote dissenting opinions. Similarly, 
in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,51 Justice Stevens and Justice 
Thomas each wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part. The one consistent aspect of the numerous recent deci-
sions, however, is that state sovereign immunity has expanded under 
the Eleventh Amendment.52 
C. Eleventh Amendment Cases Limiting Private Causes of Action 
These recent decisions began with Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida.53 This decision “was a key turning point in recent Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence.”54 In Seminole Tribe, the majority re-
jected the claim that Congress, acting under its Commerce power, 
could abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.55 The Semi-
 
 45. Id. at 12. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See McFadden, supra note 1, at 526. There are also many valid counter-arguments 
against such a broad reading of the Eleventh Amendment. 
 48. See id. 
 49. The exception is City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). This case was decided 6–
3. 
 50. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 51. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 52. See discussion infra Part III.C, for an in-depth discussion on the views of the current 
Justices. 
 53. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 54. McFadden, supra note 1, at 549. 
 55. Id. 
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nole Tribe of Florida filed suit against the state of Florida in federal 
district court to compel negotiations under the Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act (“IGRA”). IGRA was enacted under the Indian Com-
merce Clause56 and authorized suit against a state in federal court.57 
The plaintiffs compared the Indian Commerce Clause to the Inter-
state Commerce Clause.58 Relying on the Court’s decision in Pennsyl-
vania v. Union Gas Co.,59 the plaintiffs argued that Congress could 
abrogate state sovereign immunity to enforce legislation enacted pur-
suant to the Indian Commerce Clause.60 The Court rejected this ar-
gument and in the process, overruled Union Gas.61 The Court stated, 
“the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of 
suits by private parties against unconsenting States.”62 This decision 
made it clear that Congress had to pass statutes pursuant to Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment if it wanted to permit private suits 
against states in federal court.63 Theoretically, if a statute was prop-
erly enacted under Section 5, an individual could sue a state for viola-
tion of the statute; if the statute was enacted under some other 
congressional power, then the state was immune from suit. Conse-
quently, if an individual wants to sue a state in federal court, it has 
become necessary to determine under what Constitutional authority 
Congress has enacted particular legislation in order to ascertain 
whether a state is immune from suit.64 
City of Boerne v. Flores also dealt with the issue of what federal 
statutes are validly enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.65 A Catholic parish in Boerne, Texas wished to expand 
its building. The City denied the parish a building permit on the 
grounds that the building was historic. The parish sued under the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),66 which prohibited gov-
 
 56. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 51–52. 
 57. Id. at 52. 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 59. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 60. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 59–60. 
 61. Id. at 66. 
 62. Id. at 72. 
 63. See McFadden, supra note 1, at 549. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2000). The RFRA was passed in response to the 
Court’s holding in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990), which involved a free exercise claim brought by two native Americans who 
smoked peyote as part of a religious ritual. They challenged an Oregon statute that made use of 
peyote illegal. The Court upheld the law, holding that laws of general applicability which had 
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ernments at every level from substantially burdening the free exercise 
of religion unless the government could show that the burden was “in 
furtherance of a compelling government interest . . . and . . . [was] the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”67 In determining whether Congress validly passed RFRA 
pursuant to its Section 5 powers, the Court stated that Congress’s 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only extends to 
enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that 
Congress could not determine what a right is.68 To do so would be to 
make a substantive change in Constitutional protections.69 In order to 
establish whether Congress was enforcing sanctions against unconsti-
tutional actions or making a substantive Constitutional change, the 
Court created a “congruence and proportionality” test whereby the 
injury to be prevented or remedied must be proportional to the 
means adopted to achieve the end.70 The Court stated that there had 
to be a “congruence between the means used and the ends to be 
achieved.”71 Whether the remedy was appropriate would be deter-
mined by the “evil” of the problem.72 
Based on this test, the Court concluded that RFRA was grossly 
out of proportion to the statute’s object.73 The Court examined the 
legislative history of RFRA and found that Congress had failed to 
prove that any deliberate religious persecution had occurred in the 
past forty years.74 Based on this finding, the Court held that RFRA 
was not remedial legislation.75 Rather, the Court stated that the stat-
ute intended to change substantive Constitutional protections.76 
In so ruling, the Court effectively limited Congress’s ability to 
pass legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
6–3 opinion was extremely fragmented. Justice Kennedy wrote for the 
majority. Justice Stevens concurred in part. Justice Scalia concurred 
in part, in which Justice Stevens joined. Justice O’Connor wrote a 
 
the effect of burdening the free exercise of religion are not subject to heightened or strict scru-
tiny, thereby requiring no compelling government interest. 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000). 
 68. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 520. 
 71. Id. at 530. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 532. 
 74. Id. at 530. 
 75. Id. at 532. 
 76. Id. 
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dissenting opinion, which Justice Breyer joined in part. And Justices 
Souter and Breyer filed dissenting opinions. After this decision, the 
Court proceeded to dismantle every other Congressional means of 
abrogating state sovereign immunity.77 
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Edu-
cation Expense Board, a bank that sold certificates of deposit to fund 
college education sued the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board alleging unfair competition under § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act,78 claiming the Board made misleading statements about 
its savings plans.79 The Federal government intervened to defend the 
constitutionality of applying the Lanham Act to the states. The Court 
held that state sovereign immunity was neither validly abrogated nor 
voluntarily waived by the State’s activities in interstate commerce. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that there were only two 
instances when an individual could sue the state: when Congress legis-
lates to enforce rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or when a 
state consents to suit, thereby waiving its sovereign immunity.80 Since 
Congress authorized suit under the Lanham Act pursuant to its Arti-
cle I powers and because the State did not expressly consent to suit, 
Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity.81 
In Alden v. Maine, the Court extended the state sovereignty im-
munity bar announced in Seminole Tribe from lawsuits against states 
in federal court to include suits against states in state court.82 In 
Alden,83 a group of probation officers sued the State of Maine for 
monetary damages in federal court alleging violations of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act (“FLSA”).84 Following the decision in Seminole 
Tribe, the district court dismissed the case.85 The petitioners then filed 
suit in state court under the language of the FLSA which authorized 
private actions against states in their own courts.86 The Court ended 
this practice as well, holding that “the powers delegated to Congress 
under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the 
 
 77. There are still some circumstances under which Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides the justification for abrogation. For example, the Voting Rights Act. 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
 79. 527 U.S. 666, 670–71 (1999). 
 80. Id. at 670. 
 81. Id. at 672. 
 82. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 83. Id. at 711–12. 
 84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (2000). 
 85. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. 
 86. Id. 
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power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in 
state courts.”87 
The decision in Alden has fairly significant implications. It has 
moved state sovereign immunity from a narrow procedural rule to an 
“absolute principle of state sovereign immunity” because states can-
not be subject to suits in their own courts for violations of federal 
law.88 It also means that a handful of employees who happen to be 
employed by state governments are not protected by the federal regu-
lations that protect all other employees. In the abstract, these em-
ployees are covered by the statutes; however, because they lack the 
right to sue to enforce these rights, they are effectively defenseless. 
The Court has made this clear in two cases where employees sued 
their states for violations of federal employee protection statutes, 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents89 and Board of Trustees of the Uni-
versity of Alabama v. Garrett.90 
In Kimel,91 the Court again invalidated a Congressional attempt 
to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (“ADEA”), which bars employers from dis-
criminating against individuals based on age.92 The Court reiterated 
that the Eleventh Amendment stands more for what it presupposes 
rather than what it says; Congress must make clear its intent to abro-
gate and must do so under a valid grant of Constitutional authority.93 
Congress’s intentions to abrogate must be “unmistakably clear in the 
language of the statute.”94 Congress may not base its abrogation of 
the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity on the powers enumer-
ated in Article I.95 The Court found that the ADEA met the first 
 
 87. Id. The unusual aspect of Alden is that for the first time, the Court found state 
sovereign immunity beyond the Eleventh Amendment. The Court said  
the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms 
of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and 
the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from 
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the State enjoyed before the rati-
fication of the Constitution. 
Id. at 713. The real question is whether states should still “enjoy” this immunity after ratification 
when the whole people adopted the Constitution through ratification conventions independent 
of state legislatures. 
 88. Mustokoff, supra note 2, at 83. 
 89. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 90. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 91. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 et seq. (2000). 
 93. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 72–73. 
 94. Id. at 73. 
 95. Id. at 79. 
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“stringent” test.96 However, relying on the precedent established in 
Seminole Tribe, and using the congruence and proportionality test 
established in City of Boerne, the Court went on to find such suits 
against the states unauthorized under Congress’s civil rights enforce-
ment powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court stated that the burdens imposed by the ADEA were substan-
tially higher than the conduct conceived of by the Act.97 Congress had 
failed to demonstrate that evidence of age discrimination by the states 
required Congressional authorized enforcement by private plaintiffs 
via the ADEA.98 
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,99 the 
Court held that citizens could not sue State employers for money 
damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).100 The 
ADA bars employers from discriminating against a qualified individ-
ual because of the individual’s disability.101 Employers are required to 
“make reasonable accommodations” unless “the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s 
business.”102 The issue in the case was whether Congress acted pursu-
ant to a valid grant of constitutional authority when it passed the 
ADA.103 Applying a rational basis standard of review, the Court 
found that Congress acted without valid constitutional authority, 
claiming that Congress failed to identify a history of state discrimina-
tion against the disabled.104 
The enforcement rights of federal statutes by employees were re-
cently restrained even further when, in another 5–4 decision, the 
Court expanded the Eleventh Amendment to include actions against 
states by individuals before federal agencies. In Federal Maritime 
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, South Carolina 
Maritime Services leased a cruise ship in 1998, planning to operate it 
out of Charleston, South Carolina.105 A state agency, the South Caro-
lina State Ports Authority, refused to provide space because the 
 
 96. Id. at 73. 
 97. Id. at 82–83. 
 98. Id. at 83. 
 99. 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). 
 100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2000). 
 101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(2), (5), (7) (2000). 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 103. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364. 
 104. Id. at 368. 
 105. 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002). 
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planned cruises were primarily for gambling.106 The company filed a 
complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission in 1999, arguing 
that the state port authority discriminated when it refused the space 
and allowed two other ships, which permitted gambling, to dock.107 
An administrative law judge granted the state port sovereign immu-
nity, but the Federal Maritime Commission overturned the ruling 
claiming the Eleventh Amendment applied only to judicial proceed-
ings, not administrative agency proceedings.108 The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that sovereign immunity ex-
isted, regardless of the forum.109 The Supreme Court agreed. Writing 
for the majority, Justice Thomas reiterated that sovereign immunity 
goes beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment.110 He said that the 
Eleventh Amendment “does not define the scope of States’ sovereign 
immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity.”111 
The result of these opinions is that unless Congress can clearly 
show that it is relying on the Fourteenth Amendment and that it is 
relying in a manner that is congruent and proportional to the harm, 
citizens will be precluded from suing their state in either state court, 
federal court, or through an administrative agency proceeding. Unfor-
tunately, unless the Court is willing to acknowledge that state em-
ployers are participants in the marketplace, state employees have 
extremely limited recourse when seeking protection under federal 
employment statutes.112 
II. THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO THE DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The market participant exception to the dormant Commerce 
Clause recognizes that there is a difference between a state acting as a 
sovereign (exercising its taxing and regulatory powers) and a state 
behaving as a commercial actor. When states are market participants, 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 747–48. 
 108. Id. at 749. 
 109. Id. at 750. 
 110. Id. at 751–52. 
 111. Id. at 753. 
 112. Christopher E. Sherer, The Resurgence of Federalism: State Employees and the Eleventh 
Amendment, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 34 (2001). This author correctly points out that 
since current federal employment statutes were enacted prior to the current resurgence in 
federalism, Congress could not have known it would need to properly implicate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 35. 
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entering the marketplace to do business, they will not be bound by 
Commerce Clause scrutiny. 
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause provides that “Congress shall have 
Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States.”113 The provision grants legislative powers to Congress 
by furnishing Congress with the authority to regulate commerce be-
tween the states.114 The dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial doc-
trine standing for the proposition that the existence of the 
Constitution’s federal commerce power restricts the states from im-
properly burdening interstate commerce even in the absence of Con-
gressional regulation, meaning the states may not discriminate against 
interstate commerce or unduly burden interstate commerce even if 
not discriminatory.115 The doctrine states “that certain state legislation 
which regulates interstate commerce is barred, even though Congress 
has not legislated in the area, simply because Congress could regulate 
pursuant to the actual Commerce Clause.”116 The limits on state 
power derive from the basic purpose of the Commerce Clause, which 
was to create a “federal free trade unit,” with the purpose of fostering 
success and safety in the United States.117 To protect these values, the 
Court created two rules. First, clearly protectionist state laws are sub-
ject to a “per se rule of invalidity.”118 Second, a law is invalid even if it 
does not facially discriminate, but imposes an undue burden on inter-
state commerce unless the state can demonstrate a legitimate local 
interest, with only incidental effects on interstate commerce.119 
 
 113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 114. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988). 
 115. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). 
 116. Mark D. Shaffer, Reining in the Rehnquist Court’s Expansion of State Sovereign Immu-
nity: A Market Participant Exception, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 1011, 1013 (2002). This author 
proposes applying the market participant exception to the states claiming sovereign immunity in 
many contexts beyond employment, including environmental, intellectual property, and numer-
ous other areas of law. He analyzes why the current reading of the Eleventh Amendment should 
not be supported. He then argues that the Court could maintain a viable version of state sover-
eign immunity if it recognized the market participant exception when states are commercial 
actors rather than sovereigns. He does not spend any time arguing how the state fits as a market 
participant in each of these contexts. 
 117. Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 399 (1989). 
 118. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
 119. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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To determine whether a statute is valid under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the Court developed a balancing test.120 Where a 
state law is not facially discriminatory, where it “regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects 
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless 
the burden on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”121 Thus, even if Congress has not specifically 
regulated in an area, if a state regulation burdens interstate com-
merce, and the state cannot offer a legitimate purpose for doing so, 
the regulation will be considered a violation of the dormant Com-
merce Clause. 
B. The Market Participant Exception 
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corporation was the first case to 
recognize the market participant exception to the dormant commerce 
clause.122 Hughes involved a Maryland subsidy program created to 
ensure the recycling of abandoned automobiles known as “hulks.”123 
The program initially offered bounties for every Maryland-titled hulk 
converted to scrap.124 Both in-state and out-of-state processors who 
destroyed hulks with Maryland titles were eligible to collect the 
bounty.125 Maryland then revised the program, imposing stricter proof 
of title requirements on those delivering Maryland-titled hulks to out-
of-state processors.126 This resulted in a significant decline in the 
number of hulks delivered to out-of-state processors.127 
The lower court invalidated the statute based on the Commerce 
Clause, claiming the statute burdened “the flow of bounty-eligible 
hulks across state lines.”128 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning 
that Maryland did not enter the market to regulate; rather, it entered 
the market and “restricted its trade to its own citizens or businesses 
within the state.”129 The Court stated:  
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. 426 U.S. 794, 809 (1976). 
 123. Id. at 798. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 799. 
 126. Id. at 800–01. 
 127. Id. at 801–02. 
 128. Id. at 802. 
 129. Id. at 808. 
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We do not believe the Commerce Clause was intended to require 
independent justification for such action . . . . Nothing in the pur-
poses animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the ab-
sence of congressional action, from participating in the market and 
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.130 
Thus the Court decided that when a State’s action constituted partici-
pation in the market rather than regulation of it, the State would not 
be bound by the strictures of the Commerce Clause. 
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake further defined the market participant 
rule.131 In Reeves, South Dakota built a cement plant in 1919 in re-
sponse to a cement shortage in the state.132 The plant produced more 
cement than the state could use, however, so South Dakota began 
selling the cement to customers in nearby states.133 Some time later, 
due to a variety of reasons, the plant was faced with greater demand 
than supply, so South Dakota decided it would sell cement to custom-
ers who lived in the state before it sold cement to out-of-state cus-
tomers.134 
An out-of-state buyer affected by the restriction filed suit claim-
ing South Dakota was hoarding its cement in violation of the Com-
merce Clause.135 The District Court agreed, but the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit overturned the District Court’s ruling, conclud-
ing that South Dakota was simply acting “in a proprietary capacity.”136 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit, stating that 
“the [dormant] Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes 
and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national 
marketplace.”137 The Court saw no Constitutionally-mandated plan to 
limit the states’ ability to operate in a free market.138 The Court ex-
plained that the exception is based on the “long recognized right of 
trader or manufacturer . . . to exercise his own independent discretion 
as to parties with whom he will deal” and that “evenhandedness” 
requires that states should share these “freedoms from federal con-
straints” as well.139 
 
 130. Id. at 809–10. 
 131. 447 U.S. 429 (1980). 
 132. Id. at 430. 
 133. Id. at 431–32. 
 134. Id. at 432–33. 
 135. Id. at 433. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 436–37. 
 138. Id. at 437. 
 139. Id. at 438–39. 
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After these several cases and others that attempted to define the 
market participant exception, the Supreme Court imposed a limit on 
how far the exception can go in South-Central Timber Development, 
Inc. v. Wunnicke.140 In Wunnicke, Alaska imposed a requirement 
whereby buyers of unprocessed Alaskan timber were required to 
“partially process the timber in Alaska prior to shipping it out of the 
state.”141 The Court distinguished these actions from other cases 
where states were acting as market participants because Alaska was 
regulating how the buyer handled timber sold by the state.142 The 
Court said that in Hughes, the state participated as a purchaser.143 
And in Reeves, the state, dealing with a product that was not a natural 
resource, participated by choosing with whom to do business.144 In 
Wunnicke, the state was not only choosing with whom to do business, 
the state was telling them how they had to do business in order to 
participate with the state of Alaska. In doing so, Alaska was acting as 
“more than merely a seller of timber. . . . Despite the fact that the 
purchaser [had] taken delivery of the timber and paid for it,” the 
buyer could not do with the timber as it pleased.145 The Court stated 
that a state could not impose conditions, “whether by statute, regula-
tion, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of 
that particular market.”146 Thus, the market participant exception 
allows states to function in the marketplace without concern from the 
Commerce Clause as long as they don’t impose conditions beyond 
their own dealings, conditions the Court considers regulation. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO 
STATES AS PRIVATE EMPLOYERS 
There are several reasons why the market participant exception 
should apply analogically to states when federal regulations apply to 
states acting as employers. First and foremost, when states employ the 
market participant exception, they enjoy the benefit of acting as a 
private company without Commerce Clause scrutiny. If states are 
able to enjoy the benefits of private companies, they should also be 
 
 140. 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
 141. Id. at 84. 
 142. Id. at 95–96. 
 143. Id. at 95. 
 144. Id. at 96. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 97. 
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subject to the same restrictions as private companies. Finding other-
wise leads to disparate treatment of state and private actors in com-
mercial market regulation and arguably gives state business interests 
an unfair competitive advantages vis-à-vis private companies. Second, 
state employers are market participants. There are no instances when 
a state is an employer that it is acting in a regulatory capacity. Finally, 
the current Justices of the Court who argue for state sovereign immu-
nity are some of the same Justices who argue strongly for the market 
participant exception. In fact, the arguments these Justices use when 
defending the market participant exception are equally as convincing 
when the states are employers. Therefore, the same reasoning ought 
to apply. 
A. States Should Not Have Their Cake and Eat it Too 
 The market participant exception to the dormant Commerce 
Clause has worked to states’ benefit. It allows them to act in the same 
capacity as a private company by discriminating against out-of-state 
interests without Commerce Clause concern. If states are going to 
enjoy the benefits of private employers, they ought to be subject to 
the same limits as private employers. Ostensibly, states are bound to 
follow federal law under the Supremacy Clause.147 Under the current 
application of state sovereign immunity, federal employment legisla-
tion is valid under the Commerce Clause as applied to the states. Yet 
because Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity, there 
is essentially no remedy for a private individual against the state 
should the state violate the law, because the Court has made it virtu-
ally impossible for Congress to create remedies against the states 
without their consent. This creates an anomalous result. States are 
immune from suit for violating laws that apply to private employers 
and the federal government acting as an employer, even when the 
conduct of the parties is identical. 
There are methods to enforce federal laws against the states to 
vindicate individual rights. In Alden, the Court laid out several of 
these methods, including using federal funds as an exchange for im-
munity waiver, lawsuits by the federal government on behalf of indi-
viduals, and suits against individual state officials for injunctive relief 
 
 147. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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or damages.148 However, none of these methods provide all wronged 
individuals with satisfactory relief. 
The first suggestion, to use grants of federal funds in exchange 
for waiver, is problematic on several levels. First, it leads to the same 
kind of inconsistent result currently experienced between state em-
ployees and federal and public employees. Citizens in states that have 
waived immunity will be able to sue under the statutes while citizens 
in states that have not waived immunity will not be able to sue. This 
leads to the same arbitrary result where one citizen will have a rem-
edy while another citizen with the exact same claim will not, simply 
based on where that individual lives. “[E]nforcement of a person’s 
federal civil rights should not depend on whether a state decides to 
waive immunity for particular violations.”149 
In addition, the likelihood of states taking this exchange is slim. 
Theoretically, the reasons chosen by Congress to approve legislation 
would compel state legislatures and governors to allow waiver by 
state employees of federal claims. Reality is less meticulous, however. 
For example, in Maine, Governor Angus King vetoed a bill passed by 
the Maine legislature that would have waived Maine’s immunity on 
FLSA claims, on the basis that such suits would be too inconvenient 
and expensive.150 It is not unreasonable to assume that the result 
would be the same in other states.151 
The other problem with waiver is that after College Savings, the 
Court requires states to affirmatively waive their immunity to suit. 
Previously, Congress could condition state participation in federally 
regulated commercial fields on its waiver of sovereign immunity, thus 
effecting a constructive waiver of sovereign immunity.152 The Court in 
College Savings decided that constructive waiver was inconsistent 
with the requirement that a state show an unequivocal, “clear decla-
ration” of its waiver.153 
The Alden Court’s second suggestion, that the federal govern-
ment sue on behalf of individuals, is also not a fully adequate remedy. 
 
 148. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755–57 (1999). 
 149. McFadden, supra note 1, at 561. Enforcement of rights should also not depend on how 
much federal money is involved. 
 150. Id. at 561–62. 
 151. By the way, if the states were truly so opposed to these federal remedies as the majority 
seems to assume they are, then why weren’t they able to persuade their senators to carve out 
immunity for them in the federal legislation? 
 152. Sosunova & Tucker, supra note 1, at 263. 
 153. College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
680 (1999). 
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It is unlikely that the federal government would be willing to sue on 
behalf of most individual plaintiffs. To do so, the federal government 
would have to be more actively involved in enforcing individual 
rights, a result that makes little sense in light of the fact that one point 
of broadening state sovereign immunity is to limit the reach of the 
federal government.154 In addition, this resolution leads to the dispa-
rate result where one individual will have a remedy and another will 
not for the same conduct.155 The bottom line is that the federal gov-
ernment will not have enough resources or interest to pursue many 
valid claims unless they are part of more systemic abuse in a given 
state. 
The methods available to private plaintiffs are inadequate to 
vindicate their federal rights. Citizens need to be able to sue state 
employers who violate their individual federal rights. If states are 
allowed under the market participant exception to escape Commerce 
Clause scrutiny because they are not acting like sovereigns, then 
states should not be allowed to claim sovereign immunity for the 
same actions. 
B. State Employers are Market Participants 
Under foreign international common law, a sovereign is only 
immune from suit when it acts as a sovereign. When a state is partici-
pating in commerce, it is subject to all commercial laws and to suit for 
violating these laws.156 Initially, all sovereigns were immune. During 
the early twentieth century, the restrictive theory was embraced. Un-
der this theory, foreign sovereign immunity became limited to inter-
nal legislative acts, administrative acts, acts concerning its armed 
 
 154. See McFadden, supra note 1. 
 155. The final suggestion, suing individual state officials for injunctive relief or damages, is 
not likely to be an effective remedy either. Suing a state official as an exception to the Eleventh 
Amendment was first developed in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Court in that case 
held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officers, even when the 
remedy frustrates an official state policy. Id. at 150. Although the basic holding of the case is still 
valid, the Court has limited its use, most recently in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 
U.S. 261, 287–88 (1997). The end result is that in many cases, citizens will not be able to sue 
individual state officials for violations of federal law. 
 156. Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 
354, 357–58 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). This case goes into great detail 
explaining what acts are those of a sovereign. Id. at 360. It also gives a detailed explanation of 
why states acting as market participants should not be able to claim sovereign immunity. Id. at 
357. The court says that the purpose of treating sovereigns as market participants “is to try to 
accommodate the interest of individuals doing business with foreign governments.” Id. “Sover-
eign immunity is a derogation from the normal exercise of jurisdiction by the courts and should 
only be accorded only in clear cases.” Id. 
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forces, and acts of diplomacy.157 This theory of sovereign immunity 
was codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).158 
Under FSIA, when a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a 
market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign 
sovereign’s actions are commercial within the meaning of the FSIA.159 
The question is not whether the foreign sovereign is acting with a 
profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign 
objectives.160 Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions that 
the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the 
type of actions by which a private party engages in trade and traffic or 
commerce.161 
This approach is useful when examining the state in the role of 
employer. When states are acting as employers, they are engaging in 
the same types of actions as private employers, and hence, like mar-
ket participants. Interviewing, hiring, assigning work, monitoring 
work performance, paying salaries, paying benefits, and terminating 
employees are not the acts of a sovereign, they are the acts of market 
participants. And these are the actions taken by states as employers. 
One might see an exception when states employ elected or ap-
pointed officials. In this circumstance, it appears that the state is act-
ing in a sovereign capacity; these officials are carrying out the duties 
of the sovereign, thus conceiving the state through their actions. 
Therefore, the state ought not be treated as a market participant. 
However, the relationship between these officials as employees and 
the state as their employer is different from the relationship between 
the state and these officials while acting on the states’ behalf. As em-
ployees, these officials perform their jobs like employees in other 
contexts, and when the state is acting in this capacity, the state as em-
ployer ought to be treated as a market participant.162 
Another instance where the employer state might be seen as 
more of a sovereign than as a market participant is in subcontracting. 
What if the state were to issue employment requirements for subcon-
 
 157. Id. at 357–58. 
 158. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2000). 
 159. See Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 360–61. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Certain federal statutes, such as the ADEA, limit the statutes’ applicability to elected 
officials. In such instances, the individual may not be able to sue the state employer, but the 
limit should not be because the state is immune from suit. Rather the limitation should arise 
from the nature of the position itself and the nature of the federal statute being utilized. See 
Pub. L. 93-259, § 28(a), 88 Stat. 74, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (2000). 
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tractors that it would require of itself if it were not using subcontrac-
tors? Such requirements could be seen as regulation, thereby elimi-
nating the use of the market participant exception. An analogous 
framework is state-mandated preference laws.163 These are laws where 
states require municipalities to hire a certain number of minorities in 
subcontracts. In determining whether a state is a market participant 
under state-mandate preference laws, courts examine whether the 
local government enforcing the law is acting as an arm of the state or 
is acting independently.164 If the local government is acting on behalf 
of the state, it is treated as a market participant.165 If it is acting on its 
own, it is not treated as a market participant.166 “[S]tates mandating 
preferences on dependent local governments are acting as market 
participants, whereas states mandating preferences on autonomous 
local governments are acting as regulators.”167 This view of state-
mandated hiring preferences could translate to state-mandated re-
quirements of sub-contractors. Depending on the level of dependence 
of the subcontractor, the state as employer would be treated as a 
market participant and not be allowed to claim sovereign immunity 
when doing so. 
Another approach would be to determine whether the require-
ments imposed on the subcontractors are the same requirements pri-
vate employers impose on subcontractors. If they are the same, the 
state is acting as a market participant. If they are requirements only a 
sovereign could impose, and not a private employer, then the state is 
acting as a sovereign and sovereign immunity would apply. 
The Supreme Court itself defines the activities of a sovereign 
versus a market participant. In White v. Massachusetts Council of 
Construction Workers,168 the Court found that everyone affected by 
the city’s order was working for the city. This fact was crucial to the 
market-participant analysis in that case. The state was hiring and im-
posed hiring requirements. The Court found these actions to be those 
of a market participant. In fact, the Court in Wunnicke169 expressly 
 
 163. See Benjamin C. Bair, The Dormant Commerce Clause and State-Mandated Preference 
Laws in Public Contracting: Developing a More Substantive Application of the Market-
Participant Exception, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2408, 2409 (1995). 
 164. Id. at 2416. 
 165. Id. at 2417. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 168. 460 U.S. 204 (1983). 
 169. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 94–95 (1984). 
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cited White,170 stating that the fact the State was acting as an employer 
was “crucial to the market-participant analysis.”171 In College Savings, 
the Court stated that when states are acting as market participants, 
the risk they will act as sovereigns “is entirely absent.”172 The Court 
used as examples such sovereign activities as using custom duties, 
exclusionary trade regulations, and other exercises of governmental 
power. None of these actions or any other sovereign-type activities 
apply when states are acting as employers. Since states as employers 
are not acting as sovereigns, but rather are acting as market partici-
pants, they should not enjoy sovereign immunity. 
C. The Justices Who Support State Sovereign Immunity Support 
States as Market Participants 
The current Justices of the Supreme Court who argue for state 
sovereign immunity are the same Justices who argue strongly for the 
market participant exception. “Chief Justice Rehnquist and other 
justices of the majority in recent state sovereign immunity decisions 
are clearly willing to recognize the constitutional difference between 
a state acting as a state—versus a state acting as a market partici-
pant—when that distinction supports their states’ rights ideology.”173 
In the recent Eleventh Amendment cases,174 five Justices—
Kennedy, O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas—consistently 
support state sovereign immunity. The current Justices who were pre-
sent during the Tenth Amendment cases supported state immunity in 
those cases as well. There is no clear majority in City of Boerne, but 
for reasons other than sovereign immunity. Kennedy, Rehnquist, 
Scalia, and Thomas are in the majority. O’Connor dissents, not based 
on state sovereignty, but First Amendment grounds. In City of 
Boerne, Justice O’Connor explains that she thinks First Amendment 
jurisprudence took a wrong turn in Oregon v. Smith.175 In response to 
Smith, Congress enacted RFRA, the statute on which City of Boerne 
 
 170. 460 U.S. 204. 
 171. 467 U.S. at 95. 
 172. College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
685 (1999). 
 173. Shaffer, supra note 116, at 1014. 
 174. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 666; Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 
(2001); Federal Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 175. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544–45 (1997). 
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is based.176 O’Connor argues that Smith should be overturned, thus 
eliminating the need for the decision in City of Boerne.177 Justice Ste-
vens concurs in the City of Boerne’s result, again not for state sover-
eignty reasons. Justice Stevens argues that RFRA is a violation of the 
First Amendment Establishment Clause.178 
Most of the market participant cases took place before the mem-
bers of the current Court were appointed. However, in one way or 
another, most of the Eleventh Amendment majority have expressed a 
preference for the exception. For example, in Wunnicke, Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor were both on the court.179 Both dis-
sented in that case, arguing that Alaska was acting as a participant in 
the market.180 Since Wunnicke was the first case to limit the market 
participant exception, and these Justices disagreed with this limita-
tion, it is reasonable to surmise that they support a strong market 
participant exception for the states. Justice Stevens, the only other 
current member of the court on Wunnicke, joined the majority limit-
ing the market participant exception. He is one of the four who regu-
larly dissent in the state sovereign immunity cases. Justice Souter 
mentions the market participant exception in his dissent in a Com-
merce Clause case, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston.181 
However, Justice Souter only mentions that the city involved is a 
market participant and does not use this fact for analysis. More sig-
nificantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist points out in another Commerce 
Clause case, Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environ-
mental Quality, that the dormant Commerce Clause is irrelevant if the 
state is acting as a market participant.182 This is just another example 
of his support for the market participant exception. 
Justice Scalia is an ardent supporter of state sovereign immunity, 
finding for the states in every Eleventh Amendment case and sup-
porting the states in Tenth Amendment cases as well. In College Sav-
ings Bank, one of the Eleventh Amendment cases, Justice Scalia 
looks at the market participant exception in discussing whether a 
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 179. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 101–02 (1984). 
 180. Id. at 102–03. 
 181. 511 U.S. 383, 430 (1994). 
 182. 511 U.S. 93, 114 (1994). 
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state may constructively waive immunity.183 He states that the market 
participant exception “makes sense because the evil addressed by 
[dormant commerce clause] restrictions . . . is entirely absent where 
the States” are market participants.184 
In a footnote, Justice Scalia states that a commercial activities 
exception for all suits against States, except those commenced in fed-
eral court by citizens of another state, “hardly makes sense” because 
the text of the Eleventh Amendment “makes no distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial state activities.”185 However, the cur-
rent application of state sovereign immunity is not in the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment either, yet the Court, including Justice Scalia, 
is willing to “make sense” of such an application.186 Though admit-
tedly, the Commerce Clause (and by implication the dormant Com-
merce Clause) does focus on commercial activities. 
Although his comments make it doubtful that Justice Scalia 
would consider viewing employer states as market participants in 
terms of federal employment statutes, his reasoning behind the mar-
ket participant exception applies just as suitably when the state is 
acting as an employer as it does when the state is exempt from Com-
merce Clause scrutiny under the market participant exemption. Such 
an application makes more sense than treating state employers as 
sovereigns when they are clearly acting as participants in the market-
place. 
CONCLUSION 
States should not be given sovereign immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment when they are acting as private employers, but 
should be treated as what they are: market participants. As an em-
ployer, a state is not acting in its regulatory capacity, but is participat-
ing in the market as a private actor. States have benefited from being 
seen as market participants, allowing them to function in the same 
 
 183. College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
685 (1999). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 686 n.4. 
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capacity as a private company without Commerce Clause concerns. If 
state employers are going to enjoy the freedom from Commerce 
Clause restraints, they ought to be subject to the same limits as pri-
vate employers. This can be done by using the market participant 
exception in another capacity, and treating state employers as a mar-
ket participants. Such a determination would not be difficult. When 
Congress passes a law of general applicability pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause whereby violators of federal law are subject to suit in 
federal court, then sovereign immunity is abrogated.187 If the law does 
not regulate commerce, then the Commerce Clause will render the 
law invalid. If the federal statute regulates commerce, and the state is 
in violation of the federal statute, then the state is acting as a market 
participant and Congress may abrogate its sovereign immunity. Al-
ternatively, when the state is acting as an employer, there is no sover-
eign immunity because the state is a market participant. Thus, states 
would be immune when acting as sovereigns, but subject to the same 
restrictions as their private counterparts when acting as employers, 
and thus, market participants. 
 
 187. This proposal is essentially a return to Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), 
and an overturning of all of the Eleventh Amendment cases since Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), whether they deal with the employee/employer relationship or not. 
